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Abstract: 
This paper focuses on discourse analysis, particularly persuasive discourse, using 
pragmatics and rhetoric in a combined way, called by  Pragma-Rhetoric. It can be 
said that this is a cognitive approach to both pragmatics and rhetoric. Pragmatics is 
essentially Gricean, Rhetoric comes from a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
extending his notion of discourse to meso- and micro-discourses. Two kinds of 
intentions have to be considered: first, communicative intention, and, then, 
persuasive intention. The fulfilment of those intentions is achieved by a successful 
persuasive-communicative action. The psychological, philosophical and logical 
aspects derived from the pragma-rhetorical perspective are crucial in view of its 
applications in several practical domains. 
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Introduction 
This article begin with a 
recognition to a philosopher of action, 
language and communication, Marcelo 
Dascal, a Leibnizian who particularly 
interested in semantics and pragmatics, 
who has contributed so much to the 
development of philosophy in the last 30 
years. The aim of this paper is to show a 
pragmatic and rhetorical view in 
discourse analysis, combining both 
disciplines in order to explain the 
intentional phenomena that occur in most 
communicative uses of language, 
namely, the communicative intention and 
the intention of persuading.1 This clearly 
implies a theoretical choice in the field of 
pragmatics as far as pragmatics is not 
conceived in a merely semiotic way (not 
to say, in an impossible “semiologic” 
way), but in an intentional way following 
the path open by Austin and, particularly, 
by Grice. This also implies a new view on 
the ancient rhetoric, a choice in favour of 
                                                         
1
The combination of pragmatics and 
rhetoric has been suggested by some scholars, 
including Dascal himself, but it is quite difficult to 
“marry” such an ancient discipline as rhetoric with 
such a new discipline as pragmatics, if we do not 
put both in the same “register level”, i.e. in the level 
of intentionality. Read, Dascal, M. and A. G. Gross 
(1999), The Marriage Of Pragmatics And Rhetoric. 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 32 (2). 
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a neo-Aristotelian rhetoric, where, in the 
well-known triangle ethos-logos-pathos, 
the elaboration and realisation of 
discourse is especially analysed in terms 
of what is inside the taxis (dispositio), that 
is to say, the order of discourse, and not 
so much in terms of what is inside the 
elocution. In fact, this is a choice in favour 
of a rhetoric linked to dialectics2 and not 
so linked to poetics (or the current 
literature theory), introducing the idea of 
the intention of persuading by the 
discourse maker. 
The first section of the paper 
consists in a few remarks about the 
different approaches taken in discourse 
analysis in general, from sociology to 
ethnomethodological conversation 
analysis, in order to situate the 
perspective combining pragmatics and 
rhetoric. The second section is devoted 
to the way of understanding 
communicative intention in Gricean 
pragmatics. The third one focuses on a 
neo-Aristotelian rhetoric that can be 
merged with pragmatics in a theory called 
pragma-rhetoric, which is the topic of the 
fourth section. We end with a few 
concluding remarks. 
 
Forms of discourse analysis 
The most important conceptual 
problem of discourse analysis is the 
delimitation of the very idea of discourse. 
Depending on the different theoretical 
views adopted for that analysis, 
discourse is conceptualized in quite 
                                                         
2
See, Aristotle, Rhetoric, on very 
beginning of his book 
different ways. For some scholars what is 
important in discourse is just its structure, 
for others its functionality, for many 
others its social role, and for some others 
its communicative features in terms of 
context, cultural interaction, and so on.3 
For a long time linguistics forgot the 
analysis of discourse, even in semantics 
and pragmatics. Semantics was mainly 
lexical and sometimes sentential, in the 
modern post-Fregean sense. 
Pragmatics, before the analysis of 
indexicality, was the ‘waste-basket’ of 
linguistics, 4  and it seems that general 
references to context were enough for 
calling pragmatics to any language 
theory. 
Our main reason for not being 
interested in sociological approaches to 
discourse analysis is that the standard 
sociology of discourse takes it, at the 
same time, as an indicator of social 
practices, basically of social 
order/disorder, and as a factor of the 
construction of social reality. This 
approach can be seen in so different 
authors as Goffman, 5  Bourdieu, 6 or 
Berger and Luckmann.7 What is lacking 
in this approach is a socio-psychological 
conception of the discourse-maker, more 
                                                         
3
Schiffrin, D. (1994), Approaches to 
discourse. Oxford: Blackwell 
4
Bar-Hillel, Y. (1971), Out of the 
Pragmatics Waste-Basket, Linguistic Inquiry 2, P., 
401-407 
5
Goffman, E. (1981), Forms of talk. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 
6
Bourdieu, P. (1984), Questions de 
Sociologie. Paris: Minuit 
7
Berger, P. and Th. Luckmann (1966), 
The Social Construction of Reality. New York: 
Doubleday. 
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precisely, a cognitive conception of the 
individuals involved in a discourse, 
alternatively taking the roles of speaker 
and audience. The sociological analysis 
of discourse can contribute to taxonomy 
of different social groups, and then to an 
explanation of the interactions among 
those groups in terms of their contribution 
to discourse production and 
reproduction, but it forgets all cognitive 
aspects (psychological and linguistic) of 
discourse making and understanding. 
Foucault’s philosophical approach to 
discourse, especially focused on the 
relationships between discourse and 
power (the order of discourse is given by 
the discourse of order), is not very far 
from sociological approaches and lacks 
those same aspects.8 
It happens quite the same with 
some anthropologists, ethnographers of 
communication, and ethno 
methodologists. Their analysis of 
discourse has to do with a more general 
cultural analysis and the defense of 
specific cultural identities and 
worldviews. These approaches go from 
ethnography to ethno linguistics through 
some major trends in anthropology. What 
is remarkable here is that they collect a 
huge number of empirical data 
(discourses), but at the end, there is no 
theoretical analysis –explanation- of 
them, because meaning in 
communication is always something 
negotiated in the framework of the 
                                                         
8
Foucault, M. (1966), Les Mots et les 
Choses. Paris: Gallimard 
structure and norms of the group.9 
The critique can be particularly 
extended to the cultural analysis 
approach of the Palo Alto School in what 
is called “cultural pragmatics” (Bateson, 
Watzlawick and Hall), given the fact that 
methodologically they take the global 
cultural system as the departure point for 
studying communicative acts by 
individuals. This is why they give an 
extraordinary relevance to the analysis of 
different kinds and levels of context.  
Situating there the study of general 
interaction, considered as an open 
system where, particularly, 
communication takes place. Taking into 
account the effects of interaction on the 
individuals, they distinguish between 
digital communication and analogical 
communication, and they focus on what 
they call “pragmatic paradoxes” as the 
way of reaching the core of their theory 
on cultural pragmatics.10 
In contrast with these 
approaches, we take into account the 
development of pragmatics from Austin 
and Grice on. That means that the 
pragmatic approach we take for 
discourse analysis is an intentional one 
and not a behaviorist one, as it is the case 
of the semiotic pragmatics done in Morris’ 
                                                         
9
See, Garfinkel, H. (1967), Studies in 
Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, read, Sacks, H. (1992), Lectures on 
Conversation. Oxford: Blackwell, see also, Sacks, 
H., E. A. Schegloff and G. Jefferson (1974), A 
Simplest Systematics for the Organization of 
Turn-Taking for Conversation, Language 50, P., 
696-735. 
10
Watzlawick, P., J. Helmick Beavin, and 
D. Jackson Don (1972), Une Logique de la 
Communication. Paris: Seuil 
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framework.11 
 
Pragmatics: Intentions in 
communication 
Since the work by Austin and 
Grice, linguistic pragmatics has been 
mainly focused on the communicative 
use of language conceived as intentional 
human action. The study of the agent’s 
beliefs, desires and, particularly, 
intentions is crucial for understanding 
what she has done. Naturally, then, the 
analysis of beliefs, desires, and, 
particularly, intentions is at the center of 
pragmatic studies. Grice’s study on 
meaning intentions opened a long debate 
on the exact definition of the now 
so-called communicative intentions. Most 
approaches construct intention as a 
primitive mental state, i.e., non-definable 
in terms of other mental states such as 
beliefs and desires 12 . Communicative 
intentions share, of course, the 
characteristics of intentions in general, 
for instance: 
a. They are the mental causes of actions, 
that is, they are what together with 
some bodily movements constitute an 
action, as distinct from a mere event. 
b. They have conditions of consistency. 
You can desire p and desire not-p at 
                                                         
11
Morris, C. (1938), Foundations of the 
theory of signs. In O. Neurath, R. Carnap and C. 
Morris (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of Unified 
Science I, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
P., 77-138.  Reprinted in C. Morris (1971), Writings 
on the General Theory of Signs, The Hague: 
Mouton 
12
Grice, H. P. (1957), Meaning, 
Philosophical Review 66, 377-388. Reprinted in H. 
P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, P., 213-223. 
the same time, but you cannot intend 
p and intend not-p at the same time. 
c. Their object is presupposed to be 
attainable by the agent. You can 
desire to go to the moon this 
afternoon, but you cannot intend to go 
to the moon this afternoon (unless you 
are a multimillionaire who has made 
an arrangement with some spatial 
agency). 
d. Their object represents their 
conditions of satisfaction. 
Communicative intentions have also 
some features of their own: 
e. They are usually intentions-in-action 
and not prior intentions (see Searle 
1983 for the distinction)13. 
f. They are social, in the Weberian 
sense of social action, i.e. they are 
always oriented towards some other 
agent –the addressee. 
g. They are overt, that is, they are to be 
recognized by the addressee. 
h. Their satisfaction consists precisely in 
that recognition by the addressee. 
The last three characteristics are 
already pointed out in the first version of 
M-intentions of Grice 14  and their exact 
formulation seems to constitute the 
reason for the main critiques and 
subsequent reformulations by Grice 
himself : 
““U meant something by uttering 
                                                         
13
Searle, J. (1983), Intentionality: An 
essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
14
Ibid, 1957/1989. P.,  220,, ““A meant 
something by x” is (roughly) equivalent to “A 
intended the utterance of x to produce some effect 
in an audience by means of the recognition of this 
intention””.  
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x” is true if, for some audience A, U 
uttered x intending: 
(1) A to produce a particular response 
r 
(2) A to think (recognize) that U 
intends (1) 
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his 
fulfillment of (2).”15  
First, communicative intentions 
are intentions to produce some response 
on the part of the addressee. The issue 
has been to define what such a response 
should exactly be. It seems that what the 
speaker usually intends by her 
communicative action is to change the 
mental states of the addressee. But what 
change should it be for the 
communicative intention to be 
successful? The intention of the speaker 
when she says, for instance, ‘It is raining’ 
could be to induce the addressee to 
believe that it is raining or, maybe, to 
believe that the speaker believes that it is 
raining. But is any of these beliefs on the 
part of the addressee necessary for the 
communicative action to be successful 
qua communicative action? The most 
common answer has been negative. 
Perlocutionary aspects of that sort have 
been excluded from the content of 
communicative intentions. It seems that 
the addressee’s only new mental state 
needed is his recognition of the speaker’s 
communicative intention; his 
understanding of the speaker’s 
                                                         
15
Grice, H. P. (1969), Utterer’s Meaning 
and Intentions, Philosophical Review 78, p. 92. 
Reprinted in H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of 
Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989, p. 86-116. 
utterance. This is what has been called 
‘illocutionary uptake’:16 
The exact formulation of this overt 
nature of communicative intentions has 
been a subject of hot debate, some 
arguing for a reflexive (self-referential) 
definition, others for a potentially infinite 
but practically finite number of clauses in 
the definition, with conceptual, logical or 
psychological arguments. What seems to 
be a matter of consensus is that every 
covert or even neutral (with respect to its 
intended recognition by the addressee) 
aspect of the speaker’s intention is left 
out of the definition of communicative 
intentions. One way of summing this up 
is, finally, to say that the fulfillment of 
communicative intentions consists 
precisely in being recognized by the 
addressee. 
Much of the work in current 
Pragmatics views linguistic 
understanding as the process of 
recognition of the speaker’s 
communicative intentions. The 
addressee relies on linguistic and 
extralinguistic information for reaching 
                                                         
16
“In the case of illocutionary acts we 
succeed in doing what we are trying to do by 
getting our audience to recognize what we are 
trying to do. But the ‘effect’ on the hearer is not a 
belief or a response; it consists simply in the hearer 
understanding the utterance of the speaker.” 
Searle, J. (1969), Speech Acts: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 47; Read also, “The 
understanding of the force of an utterance in all 
cases involves recognizing what may be called 
broadly an audience-directed intention and 
recognizing it as wholly overt, as intended to be 
recognized.” Strawson, P. F. (1964), Intention and 
Convention in Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 
73, p. 439-60.  
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that recognition. The ulterior 
perlocutionary effects on the audience, 
intended or not intended by the speaker, 
are usually ignored by pragmatic studies. 
This is where rhetoric can make its 
contribution. Persuasive as well as 
convincing and other kinds of 
perlocutionary intentions seem to 
constitute the basis of rhetorical studies 
of linguistic use. 
 
Rhetoric: A new vision of an old art 
One of the worst things that 
happened to rhetoric was its inclusion as 
a part of literature theory and practice, 
thus forgetting its original status in the 
works, for example, of Isocrates and 
Aristotle. Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, 
which in fact is the opening declaration of 
his School of  Rhetoric, is a good 
precedent of Book I of Aristotle’s  
Rhetoric. It is clear that Aristotle 
lacks a definition of rhetoric and that the 
beginning of Book I is an attempt to 
situate it in relation with dialectics: 
 
“It is further evident that it 
belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real 
and apparent means of persuasion, just 
as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the 
real and apparent syllogism… Rhetoric 
then may be defined as the faculty of 
discovering the possible means of 
persuasion in reference to any subject 
whatever. This is the function of no other 
of the arts, each of which is able to instruct 
and persuade in its own special subject; 
thus, medicine deals with health and 
sickness, geometry with the properties of 
magnitudes, arithmetic with number, and 
similarly with all the other arts and 
sciences.”
17 
                                                         
17
Ibid, Aristotle, Rhetoric I, p. 1355b15 & 
 
It has been a very common view 
to emphasize the relevance of pathos in 
classical rhetoric, contrary to the 
insistence by Aristotle on all the three 
components “ethos, logos, pathos,” and 
particularly on logos. Remember 
Aristotle’s words in the sense that the 
best rhetorician is that who is expert in 
syllogisms. It is noteworthy that in the 
composition of a discourse Aristotle gives 
an especial importance to the taxis, that 
is, to the configuration and ordering of the 
elements of the discourse. Book III of his 
Rhetoric is not simply a book on style. It is 
also a book on the parts of speech, which 
means a book on the internal ordering of 
discourse. 
It is crucial for our purpose to take 
this idea of ordering, not only for the 
macro-discourses of the three rhetorical 
kinds of discourse (deliberative, forensic, 
epideictic) taken into account by the 
Greek tradition, but also for the micro- 
and meso-discourses, in which we are 
interested when analysing everyday 
communication. This is particularly 
applicable to argumentative discourses, 
where the aim of persuading takes the 
form of that of convincing by ways of 
argumentation. In fact, its is very 
well-known that even in the case of proofs 
(in mathematics and logic) the order 
giving the structure of a demonstration 
can change without altering the result, 
making easier or more difficult the 
                                                         
25-30. 
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understanding of the proof of a theorem. 
A fortiori with everyday argumentations. 
This idea was noted, among others, by 
Apostel 18 , when he presented an 
assertion logic for a theory of 
argumentation following Rescher’s 
way 19 , and spoke about “internal 
democracy” in Greek geometry, and, by 
extension, in any axiomatics. 
One of the most interesting recent 
approaches in argumentation theory is 
“pragma-dialectics”, which was open by 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst, inspired 
by the Aristotelian dialectics and rhetoric, 
linking speech act theory with the 
dialectical theory of “critical 
rationalists” 20 . The analysis of 
argumentative discourse, taken as 
“verbal, social and rational activity aimed 
at convincing a reasonable critic of the 
acceptability of a standpoint by 
advancing a constellation of propositions 
justifying or refuting the proposition 
expressed in the standpoint”, is done by 
the study of the points of view, 
unexpressed premises, argument 
schemes, argumentation structures and, 
particularly, fallacies. Arguments are 
interpreted and reconstructed in that way, 
in order to get a clear view of the process 
of argumentation. In our viewpoint, what 
                                                         
18
Apostel, L. (1971), Assertion Logic and 
a Theory of Argumentation. Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 4, p. 92-110 
19
Rescher, N. (1968), Topics in 
Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel 
20
Eemeren, F.H. van, and R. 
Grootendorst (1984), Speech Acts in 
Argumentative Discussions. Dordrecht: Foris. 
is lacking in that approach is a cognitive 
vision of argumentation, and it must be 
said that, at the same time, they take a 
biased perspective on rhetoric, as far as 
they view rhetoric basically as a 
pathos-oriented rhetoric, minimizing the 
importance of the ethos and especially of 
the logos, and, consequently, that they 
do not take rhetoric into consideration. At 
the end, the output is that pragmatics 
collapses into semantics. 
Rhetoric is obviously not only 
important for argumentation theorists, but 
for the production, analysis and 
evaluation of any kind of persuasive 
discourse. The study of audiences by the 
new rhetorics takes an especial 
importance today, because of the new 
kinds of audiences derived from new 
forms and modes of communication, in a 
time where information technologies 
applied to communication systems are 
evolving fast. Particular interest deserves 
the study of complex (media) audiences 
and very diffuse ones. It has to be noted 
that the interest of rhetoric for audiences 
is not a sociological one. Rhetoric is 
interested in the way of shaping 
audiences by means of the realization of 
discourses. 
To return to Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
means to take into account the role 
played by the logos (and the ethos) jointly 
with the pathos. The ethos and the pathos 
are constructed by the discourse itself, 
they are not external to it, on the contrary, 
they are shaped in terms of the evolution 
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of the discourse. This is the main reason 
for giving so much importance to the 
logos, as Aristotle did.21 Consequently, 
this is also the main reason for 
emphasising the relevance of the 
structure of discourse as it is fixed in the 
taxis phase of its composition.22This old 
idea was renewed by Enlightenment 
rhetorical theorists such as Campbell 23 
and Whately, 24  and more recently by 
Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyte. 25  From 
another side, people interested in 
argumentative communication studies 
gave also a particular importance to the 
logos of that kind of discourse, and that 
lead to an abundant literature in “informal 
logic”26. 
 
 
The basis of Pragma-Rhetoric 
In our own pragma-rhetoric 
approach, the rhetoric aspect is 
essentially devoted to a study of order, 
i.e. to the planning of discourse, which 
means the production of the structure of 
                                                         
21
See, Conley, Th. M. (1990), Rhetoric in 
the European Tradition. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
22
Read, Reboul, O. (1991), Introduction à 
la rhétorique. Paris: P.U.F 
23
Campbell, G. (1776), The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric. Re-edited in 1936, Southern Illinois 
University Press. 
24
Read, Whately, R. (1828), Elements of 
Rhetoric. Reprinted in 1857 in London: Parker & 
son 
25
Perelman, Ch. and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca 
(1958), Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle 
rhétorique. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles. 
26
Walton, D.N. (1989), Informal Logic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
discourse in a dynamic perspective, given 
the fact that real discourse is what is 
finally performed as discourse with all the 
moves made in the process. What is 
important to point out is that the 
determination of that dynamic order 
responds to the intention of persuading 
by the discourse-maker. Pragma-rhetoric 
is not isolated from logic, on the contrary, 
it takes logic at the very ground in 
discourse construction, but the crucial 
notion of the intention to persuade links 
rhetoric with pragmatics in a global 
intentional architecture of individuals, 
distinguishing and combining at the same 
time communicative intention and 
persuasive intention. It is very clear that 
these two intentions are in different 
levels. We need first the fulfillment of 
communicative intention, in order to 
make possible then the fulfillment of 
persuasive intention (particularly, the 
intention to convince in argumentative 
discourse). Both in monological 
discourse and in dialogical (or 
multilogical) discourse –in what we are 
more interested- the unit of analysis is a 
unique speech act, where by means of 
the satisfaction of the communicative 
intention one can get the satisfaction of a 
persuasive intention (we are speaking, of 
course, of persuasive communication). 
What is the content of persuasive 
intentions? We are basically speaking 
about a very stable kind of intention, 
persistent through all the process of 
elaboration and performance of a 
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discourse, oriented to a particular type of 
behavior on the part of the hearers (as 
communicative intentions, persuasive 
intentions lead to a particular kind of 
individual social actions), namely, their 
persuasion in terms of the acceptance of 
beliefs and goals expressed by the 
speaker (or, at least, a significant 
reduction in the distance between the 
mental states manifested by the speaker 
and those of the hearers, naturally 
intending to lead hearers to action).27 
It is evident that in our 
pragma-rhetorical approach to the 
analysis of persuasive discourse we are 
putting in place, so to speak, a cognitive 
rhetoric, where basic intentional 
components have to be considered in 
relationship with emotive components 
and any other psychological aspect of 
speakers and hearers, changing 
alternatively their roles in the production 
of discourses. It is noteworthy that, unlike 
communicative intention, persuasive 
intention in general is not an overt 
intention. It can be an overt intention as in 
                                                         
27
“Lastly, persuasion is produced by the 
speech itself, when we establish the true or 
apparently true from the means of persuasion 
applicable to each individual subject. Now, since 
proofs are affected by these means, it is evident 
that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be 
capable of logical reasoning, of studying 
characters and the virtues, and thirdly the 
emotions –the nature and character of each, its 
origin, and the manner in which it is produced. 
Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an 
offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, 
which may be reasonably called Politics.” 
(Rhetoric I, p. 1356a-15-30); see Ibid,  Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric: Book I. 
the case of the intention to convince (by 
arguments) or as in particular kinds of 
persuasive intentions in especial 
discourse contexts. But it clearly can also 
be a covert intention: think, for example, 
about a situation where the speaker 
intends to persuade the hearers hiding 
the real persuasive intention behind her 
discourse behavior, because this is just 
the way of getting her goal in that 
particular situation. In any case, it is 
worth saying that persuasive intention 
leads the speaker to the determination of 
the structure of discourse in the taxis 
phase. No doubt, when we speak about 
the structure of discourse, we are 
speaking in a broader sense than 
Aristotle did, when he studied the division 
of the parts of speech in Book III of his 
Rhetoric, taking into account precisely 
our broader notion of discourse, 
applicable, as we noted above, to micro- 
and meso-discourses. 
One of the consequences of this 
cognitive approach to rhetoric in our 
pragma-rhetorical view is that we can aim 
at a psychological (and 
socio-psychological) and philosophical 
(philosophy of language, mind and 
action) combined study of the intentions 
involved in persuasive communication. A 
next step can probably be reached if we 
are interested in the formalization of 
those intentions. Some proposals have 
been made for communicative intention 
and we are trying to do some new ones 
for persuasive intention. Having in mind 
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the idea of applying them to the 
elaboration of communication schemes 
(in natural language processing and in 
systems of agency), to the production 
and analysis of discourse by automatic 
means, to argumentation theory, to 
discourse polemology (discussions, 
disputes) in the way open by Dascal’s 
psychopragmatics.  
 
Last remarks 
Let us make a few concluding 
remarks. First, proposing a 
pragma-rhetorical analysis of persuasive 
discourse, in terms of the study of two 
especial intentions, situated in different 
intentional levels: communicative 
intentions first, and then persuasive 
intentions. Second, we claim that a new 
reading of the Aristotelian rhetoric is 
crucial for that purpose, because of the 
importance given by Aristotle to the 
logos, in connection with the ethos and 
the pathos. Of course, a new reading is 
required if we enlarge the notion of 
discourse from the classical Greek 
tradition to current everyday discourses 
in extensively information-technology 
based communications. Third, the 
pragmatic component of our approach is 
essentially the one developed after 
Grice’s foundation of pragmatics.  Fourth, 
the psychological, philosophical and 
logical aspects of our pragma-rhetorical 
study of persuasive communication have 
to be seriously and urgently developed, 
given their applicability in very different 
and crucial domains. 
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